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THE ETHICAL VALUE OF NARRATIVE REPRESENTATION 
Rafe McGregor 
 
 
The purpose of this paper is to defend a deflationary account of the ethical value of narrative 
representation.  In §§1-2 I demonstrate that there is a necessary relation between narrative 
representation and ethical value, but not between narrative representation and moral value.  
Ethical is conceived in terms of moral as opposed to amoral and moral in terms of moral as 
opposed to immoral and the essential value of narrative representation is restricted to the 
former.  Recently, both theorists involved in the ethical turn in criticism and analytic 
philosophers have erred in conflating these two distinct kinds of value.  In §§3-5 I defend my 
deflationary view against three attempts to elevate the ethical value of narrative 
representation to moral value: Martha Nussbaum’s theory of realist novels, Noël Carroll’s 
virtue wheels, and Geoffrey Galt Harpham’s closural moral order.    
  
1. Narrative & Non-Narrative Representation 
 
My starting point is to take “narrative” and “story” as synonymous.  Representations of real 
and fictional sequences of events can be communicated in narrative and non-narrative form 
by a variety of means, including the written and spoken word and still and moving images.  I 
shall distinguish between narrative and non-narrative representations, but not between 
narratives that represent real and fictional events or between linguistic and visual narratives.1  
A minimal narrative is the product of an agent that represents:  
                                                 
1 My preference is to distinguish representations of real sequences of events from representations of fictional 
sequences of events in terms of the different role played by the imagination in the respective engagement with 
each.  Derek Matravers has recently questioned this distinction, first claiming that there is no relevant difference 
between the employment of the imagination in factual and fictional representations, and then questioning the 
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(a) one or more agents 2 and  
(b)  two or more events which are  
(c)  connected. 
Gregory Currie begins his discussion of narrativity by noting that all representations are 
created rather than found and therefore the product of a process of intentional shaping.3  A 
consequence of this intentionality is that there are two perspectives that can be adopted 
towards representations, the external and internal: 
Adopting the external perspective, we see a vehicle, something that represents a 
sequence of events in virtue of the activity of an agent we call the author.  Adopting 
the internal perspective, we examine the world of the story as if it were actual […].4 
  
Narrativity is gradational rather than categorical, i.e. admits of degrees.  The manner in which 
(a) and (b) contribute to narrativity is straightforward, but (c) has been subject to much 
debate.  Peter Lamarque takes the broadest view of the requisite connection, claiming that: 
there must be some more or less loose, albeit non-logical, relation between the events.  
Crucially, there is a temporal dimension in narrative, not just in the sense that 
component sentences are tensed but also in that there must be a temporal relation 
between the events, even if just that of simultaneity.5 
I shall accept this loose temporal connection for minimal narratives, the consequence of 
which is that the following meets the criteria for a minimal narrative: “Katy kicked the stone 
                                                                                                                                                        
role of the imagination in engaging with representations at all (Fiction and Narrative [Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014]).  As my aim is to delineate an uncontroversial characterisation of narrative, I shall 
neither contribute to this debate nor employ the imagination in my elucidation of narrative representation. 
2 Peter Goldie notes the possibility of narratives with no human characters, but excludes these from his 
discussion (The Mess Inside: Narrative, Emotion, and the Mind [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012], 19 
fn.20).  I shall not stipulate that the agents must be human, merely that they are capable of intentional action, 
such as the anthropomorphised rabbits in Richard Adams’ Watership Down and the false Maria robot in Fritz 
Lang’s Metropolis. 
3 Gregory Currie, Narratives & Narrators: A Philosophy of Stories (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 2. 
4 Currie, Narratives & Narrators, 49. 
5 Peter Lamarque, The Opacity of Narrative (London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2014), 52. 
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and missed her bus.”  As such, Currie is correct to claim that it is not the concept “narrative” 
that is philosophically interesting, but ‘the concept thing high in narrativity.’6 
 
In contrast to a minimal narrative, an exemplary narrative7 is the product of an agent that is 
high in narrativity in virtue of representing:  
(i) one or more agents and  
(ii)  two or more events which are  
(iii)  causally connected,    
 (iv) thematically unified, and 
 (v) conclude. 
Regarding (iii), Noël Carroll proposes the following connection: ‘the earlier events in the 
sequence are at least causally necessary conditions for the causation of later events and/or 
states of affairs (or are contributions thereto).’8  I shall accept that non-minimal narratives 
have a causal connection between events and that exemplary narratives have a causal 
connection which is so strong as to contribute to the thematic unity of the narrative.  Currie 
defines thematic unity as follows: 
unity is provided by a focus on some common thread in the activity of particular 
persons in particular connected circumstances, though narratives often do have, in 
addition, general thematic unity in that we are invited to generalize from the case in 
question.9 
Carroll divides narratives into two broad categories: episodic narratives, consisting of smaller 
stories where causal linkage is weak and frequently achieved by means of a recurring 
protagonist; and unified narratives, where causal linkage is high and there is a smooth 
                                                 
6 Currie, Narratives & Narrators, 34. 
7 The term is from Currie; see: Narratives & Narrators, 35. 
8 Noël Carroll, Beyond Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 126. 
9 Currie, Narratives & Narrators, 39. 
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transition from beginning to middle to end.10  The significance of thematic unity restricts 
exemplary narratives to the latter.  
 
In his taxonomy of historical representations, Hayden White identifies the absence of closure 
as characterising a text as a chronicle rather than a narrative: a chronicle merely terminates in 
medias res, leaving the reader to impose his or her own meaning upon the sequence of events 
represented.11  Carroll describes the phenomenon as ‘the almost palpable sensation that the 
story has finished-up at exactly the right spot.’12  In the taxonomy I am establishing, 
chronicles meet the criteria for minimal narratives, but not exemplary narratives.  White’s 
insistence on the importance of closure might be considered overly-demanding, however, and 
Carroll claims that soap operas and national histories are examples of exemplary narratives 
without closure.13  Soap operas are indeed high in narrativity, but they lack thematic unity 
and are episodic in nature.  Every soap opera has several stories running parallel, usually 
involving characters who live in the same place, and the narrativity within these sub-
narratives may be high despite the absence of an overarching, thematic connection.  National 
histories are similar in that they take a place as their primary focus, involve a large number of 
characters and sub-narratives, and are typically lacking in an overarching theme.  On the 
basis that they are at best borderline cases, I shall exclude both soap operas and national 
histories from the category of exemplary narratives.  Given (iii) to (v) above, exemplary 
narratives can be distinguished from lists, annals, chronicles, and diaries.  Paradigmatic 
examples include: the Bayeux Tapestry, William H. Prescott’s History of the Conquest of 
                                                 
10 Carroll, Minerva’s Night Out: Philosophy, Pop Culture, and Moving Pictures (Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2013), 123. 
11 Hayden White, “The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality,” Critical Inquiry 7 (1980), 5-27: 
21-23. 
12 Carroll, Minerva’s Night Out, 123. 
13 Carroll, Art in Three Dimensions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010 [2012]), 355-356. 
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Peru, Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will, Orson 
Welles’ Citizen Kane, and Art Spiegelman’s Maus.   
 
2. Ethical Value & Narrative Representation 
 
Given my definitions in §1, all narratives are concerned with agency in that they represent a 
minimum of a single agent and two events.  The combination of agency and events places 
narratives in the ethical sphere as all action (and inaction) is subject to ethical appraisal.  
There is thus a necessary relation between narrative representation and ethical value.  There 
are at least four ways of unpacking this relation: 
(a) In virtue of their narrativity, narrative representations can be evaluated 
ethically. 
(b) In virtue of their narrativity, narrative representations can provide illumination 
when evaluated ethically. 
(c) In virtue of their narrativity, narrative representations should be evaluated 
ethically. 
(d) The value of narrative representations qua narrative representation is ethical 
value. 
If the combination of agency and events entails an ethical dimension to narrative 
representation then (a) is obviously – but also trivially – true.  Similarly, (b) is obviously and 
trivially true of some narrative representations, but not others (especially minimal narratives, 
as I demonstrate below).  The claim in (d), that the value of narrative qua narrative (which is 
often conceived of as aesthetic value) is ethical value is the thesis that ethical value is partly 
or wholly constitutive of narrative value.  I make no such commitment in this paper and I 
shall therefore defend (c), the claim that narrative representations not only can, but should, be 
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evaluated ethically in virtue of their narrativity.  This claim is motivated by the ethical 
essence of narrative representation identified above, the consequence of which is that the 
ethical dimension cannot be ignored in narrative evaluation.14  My understanding of the 
necessary relation between narrative representation and ethical value is thus that: 
(ENNR) The engagement with a narrative representation qua narrative 
representation is incomplete without ethical evaluation. 
 
I noted that narrative representation entails dual agency in §1: even a minimal narrative is the 
product of an agent in which (at least) one agent is represented.  I quoted Currie’s 
identification of the internal perspective as examining the world of the story as if it were 
actual.  Consider the following pair of minimal narratives: 
 (i) Katy kicked the stone and missed her bus. 
 (ii) Katy kicked the dog and ran away. 
Adopting the internal perspective, one evaluates Katy’s actions in both cases.  In the absence 
of further information, (i) is ethically permissible and (ii) ethically prohibited.  Currie 
describes the external perspective as seeing a vehicle, something that represents a sequence 
of events in virtue of the activity of an agent we call the author.  In adopting the external 
perspective it is not the agency of the agent in the narrative, but of the producer of the 
narrative – the author – that is judged.15  (ii) could be represented for the following purposes: 
(A) as an example of shameful behaviour; 
(B) as an example of admirable behaviour. 
                                                 
14 I offer evidence of the ethical essence of exemplary narratives in my discussion of plot in §5. 
15 For the purposes of this paper, I shall use “author” to describe the producer of a narrative regardless of the 
representational medium employed.  Some narrative representations feature a narrator who is distinct from the 
author, but I shall not discuss the complexities of this distinction (see: Currie, Narratives & Narrators, 65-69).  I 
shall also use “audience” to describe the people who engage with a narrative representation regardless of the 
medium in which that representation is experienced. 
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From the internal perspective, Katy’s action is evaluated as unethical in both contexts (A) and 
(B); from the external perspective, the author is evaluated as ethical if he is criticising Katy’s 
action, i.e. in (A); but unethical if he is demonstrating how clever she was, e.g. in being able 
to inflict harm on the dog without being bitten, i.e. in (B).  The problem with (i) and (ii) is 
that the narratives are so minimal, communicating so little information, that there is barely 
any evidence to make an ethical evaluation of the character and none at all for an ethical 
evaluation of the author.  Both examples remain the product of an agent for which ENNR is 
true, but they show that the ethical evaluation of narratives is neither necessarily illuminating 
nor always possible from the external perspective. 
 
In §1 I identified the difference between minimal narratives and exemplary narratives as 
causal relations, thematic unity, and closure.  These three features combine to create a 
perspective or framework that is absent in minimal narratives.  Exemplary narratives are 
essentially perspectival, as Goldie makes clear in his definition:  
a representation of those events which is shaped, organized, and coloured, presenting 
those events, and the people involved in them, from a certain perspective or 
perspectives, and thereby giving narrative structure – coherence, meaningfulness, and 
evaluative and emotional import – to what is related.16 
 Lamarque refers to this perspectival nature as opacity: 
narratives are “opaque” somewhat as paintings are opaque.17  They have the same 
kind of intentionality, not just as products of intentions, but also, in different ways and 
to different degrees, through expressing thoughts or a point of view on what they 
represent.  This seems to be true of all narratives, not just those of literary fiction.18  
                                                 
16 Peter Goldie, The Mess Inside: Narrative, Emotion, and the Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 2. 
17 The opacity of paintings is that, unlike photographs, ‘they do not represent simply in virtue of standing in a 
causal relation to their subjects’ (Lamarque, The Opacity of Narrative, 9). 
18 Lamarque, The Opacity of Narrative, 9.  
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Similarly, Currie identifies a framework as ‘a preferred set of cognitive, evaluative, and 
emotional responses to the story.’19  He notes that there are no set of explicit instructions, but 
that the framework is expressed in the representation of the sequence of events.  From this 
framework Currie proceeds to 
the standard mode of engagement with narrative.  Narratives, because they serve as 
expressive of the points of view of their narrators, create in our minds the image of a 
persona with that point of view, thereby prompting us to imitate salient aspects of it – 
notably evaluative attitudes and emotional responses.  In taking on those responses, 
we thereby come to adopt, wholly or in part, the framework canonical for that work.20 
The standard mode of engagement is thus the acceptance, by audiences, of the framework 
that the author invites one to adopt. 
 
It is this framework – the preferred set of cognitive, evaluative, and emotional responses – 
that produces a more complex relation between narrative representation and ethical value in 
the case of exemplary narratives.  In contrast to minimal narratives, the necessary relation 
between narrative representation and ethical value in exemplary narratives is twofold: 
(ENEX) The engagement with an exemplary narrative qua narrative is 
incomplete without a dual ethical evaluation, from both the internal 
and external perspectives. 
The History of the Conquest of Peru and Citizen Kane therefore invite the following ethical 
evaluations: 
(1)  the agency of the characters represented in the narrative, presented as they are 
by the author within a particular framework; e.g., the agency of Francisco 
Pizarro or Charles Foster Kane. 
                                                 
19 Currie, Narratives & Narrators, 86. 
20 Currie, Narratives & Narrators, 106. 
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(2) the agency of the author in telling the story, which includes the decision to 
present the characters in the narrative within the particular framework in 
which they are represented; e.g., the agency of Prescott or Welles. 
Both the actions of the characters in the story and action of the author in telling the story are 
subject to ethical appraisal and different authors can provide different frameworks for the 
same characters and events.  In Triumph of the Will, e.g., Riefenstahl invites one to regard 
Hitler as a messianic saviour who descends from the heavens to lead the German people to 
glory.  In contrast, Oliver Hirschbiegel invites one to regard Hitler as an evil megalomaniac 
who sacrifices millions of people – including the German nation – for his self-
aggrandisement in Downfall.  If one rejects the standard mode of engagement for Triumph of 
the Will – Hitler as heroic – in adopting the internal perspective, then one will make a 
negative judgement of Riefenstahl in creating that framework in adopting the external 
perspective.21 
 
When discussing closure as a criterion of exemplary narratives in §1, I mentioned White, who 
maintains that narrative closure is a resolution that is presented by the author as either moral 
or immoral.22  When history is represented in a narrative rather than non-narrative form: 
The demand for closure […] is a demand […] for moral meaning, a demand that 
sequences of real events be assessed as to their significance as elements of a moral 
drama.23 
In the terminology I am employing, White is claiming that the standard mode of engagement 
with (historical exemplary) narratives requires the adoption of an internal perspective that 
prioritises ethical evaluation.  The necessary relation he proposes is thus similar to mine, but 
                                                 
21 Riefenstahl denied the framework I have described here post-war, which is hardly surprising.  For an 
unsurpassed philosophical discussion of the film see: Mary Devereaux, “Beauty and evil: the case of Leni 
Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will,” in J. Levinson, ed., Aesthetics and ethics, 227-256. 
22 White, “The Value of Narrativity,” 23. 
23 White, “The Value of Narrativity,” 24. 
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narrower and stronger.  My claim is that all narrative representations require the adoption of 
an internal perspective that involves ethical evaluation on the basis of the necessary ethical 
dimension of narrative representation.  The greater complexity of the necessary relation 
between exemplary narratives and ethical evaluation on the one hand and minimal narratives 
and ethical evaluation on the other hand creates the need for a two-part thesis: 
(TNR) Narrative representations are essentially ethical in virtue of their combination 
of agency and events. 
(TEX) Exemplary narratives are essentially ethical in virtue of both the combination 
of agency and events represented and the agency of the author in adopting the 
framework particular to the narrative.   
In other words, narrative representation necessarily invites ethical evaluation in the adoption 
of the internal perspective and exemplary narrative representation necessarily invites a dual 
ethical evaluation, in the adoption of both the internal and external perspectives. 
 
This is neither a controversial nor remarkable claim and would perhaps not even be 
interesting had it not served as a springboard for erroneous conclusions about the relationship 
between narrative representation and ethical value.  I mentioned the following distinction in 
my abstract, which I have been employing heretofore and shall continue to employ (unless 
quoting directly): 
(I) Ethical as opposed to a-ethical or amoral, i.e. a positive, negative, or 
ambiguous evaluation of agency or character; and 
(II) Moral as opposed to immoral or unethical, i.e. a positive evaluation of agency 
or character.24 
                                                 
24 The difference is usually conceived in terms of “ethics” as a concern with social values and/or the good life 
and “morality” as a concern with judgement and/or the principles of right conduct.  The locus classicus of this 
distinction is Hegel’s critique of Kant’s Moralität (morality) in terms of Sittlichkeit (ethical life) in 
Phenomenology of Spirit and Elements of Philosophy of Right.  It is sometimes articulated in terms of ethics as 
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Returning to the pair of examples above, both Triumph of the Will and Downfall have ethical 
value, but only Downfall has moral value.  My thesis, as articulated in TNR and TEX, is that 
narrative representation is essentially ethical in virtue of its narrativity.  The erroneous 
conclusion to draw is that every narrative representation is essentially moral, i.e. subject to a 
positive ethical evaluation in virtue of its narrativity.  In order to avoid conflation with a 
distinction that can at times be subtle, I shall revise my two-part thesis as follows: 
(TRNR) Narrative representations are essentially ethical, but not essentially 
moral, in virtue of their combination of agency and events. 
(TREX) Exemplary narratives are essentially ethical, but not essentially moral, 
in virtue of both the combination of agency and events represented and 
the agency of the author in adopting the framework particular to the 
narrative. 
The arguments that narrative representations are essentially moral focus exclusively on 
exemplary narratives and I shall follow suit.  In the remainder of this paper I defend my 
deflationary account of the ethical value of exemplary narratives, TREX, against three 
inflationary accounts – from Nussbaum, Carroll, and Harpham respectively. 
 
3. The Moral Value of Novels 
 
The elevation of the ethical value of narrative representation to moral value has primarily 
focused on fictional narratives, especially – although not exclusively – literary fictions, 
usually understood as those fictions that are either judged as artistically or aesthetically 
valuable.  Patrick Fessenbecker describes the ‘ethical turn’ at the end of the twentieth century 
                                                                                                                                                        
descriptive and morality as normative, but this is an over-simplification – particularly when applied to the 
evaluation of narrative representations.  The distinction has been embraced by critical theory and developed by 
Jürgen Habermas, who contrasts moral discourse with ethical discourse in Justification and Application and The 
Inclusion of the Other.  In analytic philosophy, Bernard Williams adopted the distinction in Ethics and the 
Limits of Philosophy.  
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as involving a confluence of three traditions: the neo-Aristotelian, exemplified by Nussbaum; 
the challenge to scientistic epistemology, exemplified by Richard Rorty; and Levinasian 
poststructuralism, exemplified by Jacques Derrida.25  What each of these disparate strands 
holds in common is a belief that the literary experience, the experience of engaging with a 
literary work qua literature (however that is conceived in the respective traditions) is in some 
way essentially moral.  Within the ethical turn, more attention has been paid to literary 
narratives than lyric poetry and Rorty and Nussbaum focus on the narrative category of 
novels.26  Nussbaum narrows her focus even further, to the genre of ‘realist Anglo-
American’27 and ‘realist social’28 novels, of which the works of Charles Dickens, Henry 
James, Marcel Proust, and Richard Wright are paradigmatic.  I shall hereafter refer to this 
genre of exemplary narratives as realist novels.  Nussbaum’s approach takes the unity of 
literary form and literary content as its starting point.  As I am sympathetic to the view that 
there is a particularly intimate relationship between form and content in literature, I shall 
accept the inseparability relation without probing its precise nature, agreeing that form and 
content cannot be separated in the experience of a work of literature qua literature, although 
they can and are separated for critical and analytical purposes.29  Commentators have 
identified three ways in which Nussbaum binds form-content inseparability to moral value – 
literary content, literary form, and literary imagination – and I shall consider each in turn.30 
 
                                                 
25 Patrick Fessenbecker, “In Defense of Paraphrase,” New Literary History 44 (2013), 117-139: 118. 
26 Richard Rorty’s nuanced contribution to the ethical turn is set out in: Contingency, irony, and solidarity (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).  
27 Martha Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1990 [1992]), 10. 
28 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 87. 
29 There are various conceptions of form-content unity, which include the following relations: identity, 
indistinguishability, constitution, inseparability, and irreducibility.  Nussbaum is unclear as to the precise 
relation envisaged.  Due to the terminology employed in the quote immediately below I have characterised the 
relation as inseparability, but the same quote could also be conceived as a constitution relation, e.g. that form 
(partly) constitutes content. 
30 See, e.g., respectively: Patrick Gardiner, “Professor Nussbaum on The Golden Bowl,” New Literary History 
15 (1983), 179-184; Richard Eldridge, “‘Reading for Life’: Martha C. Nussbaum on Philosophy and Literature,” 
Arion 2 (1992), 187-197; and Cora Diamond, “Martha Nussbaum and the Need for Novels,” Philosophical 
Investigations 16 (1993), 128-153. 
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According to Nussbaum: ‘Literary form is not separable from philosophical content, but is, 
itself, a part of content – an integral part, then, of the search for and of the statement of 
truth.’31  A consequence of inseparability is that content cannot be paraphrased without loss 
of identity and, as a result, certain truths can only be conveyed in narrative form such that 
there is a unique kind of non-propositional moral knowledge communicated by realist novels.  
Realist novels are particularly suited to the Aristotelian conception of moral value because of 
their structural complexity, open-endedness, and concern with the ordinary and the 
everyday.32  The standard mode of engagement with these novels extends life horizontally by 
broadening the reader’s experience of people, places, and events, and vertically by the 
precision and richness of their representations.33  Nussbaum extends the moral value of realist 
novels to the political sphere, claiming that they promote liberal democracy.  The moral and 
political value of reading, e.g., Hard Times is that the novel ‘makes us acknowledge the equal 
humanity of members of social classes other than our own’.34  Dickens’ framework combines 
narrative form with moral content such that one cannot adopt the standard mode of 
engagement without accepting that the factory workers are fully human.  Hard Times thus 
embodies a liberal democratic vision in its framework, which is enacted by the novel’s 
form.35  Realist novels promote compassion as well as egalitarianism because ‘concern for 
the disadvantaged is built into the structure of the literary experience’.36  The moral content 
of realist novels cannot be separated from the narrative representation without loss of identity 
and the moral evaluation of a novel therefore requires that the moral content be judged in the 
narrative form in which it is presented in the novel rather than in a paraphrased (or otherwise-
altered) form.  Moral value is not only relevant to the literary value of Dickens’ works, but 
                                                 
31 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 3. 
32 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 46-47.  These points and the relationship between literature and life mentioned 
below are reiterated in: Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995). 
33 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 48. 
34 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 34. 
35 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 36. 
36 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 87. 
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essential, because the novels cannot be read qua literature without accepting the morality 
promoted.37 
 
In the terms I set out in §2, Nussbaum advances the following claim: 
(MNRN) Realist novels are essentially moral in virtue of both the combination 
of agency and events represented and the agency of the author in 
adopting the framework particular to the novel. 
In defence of MNRN, Nussbaum argues that novels with immoral frameworks do not 
constitute counter-examples to her position.  ‘Literature has great seductive power: it can get 
us to sympathize with class privilege, the oppression of women, war and pillage, and […] 
hideous racism.’38  Her point is that in the category she has selected (the novels of Dickens, 
James, Proust, and Wright) the narrative form is part and parcel of the moral value and this 
thesis is unaffected by the existence of other categories (e.g., the surrealist novels of Henry 
Miller and Louis-Ferdinand Céline), where the narrative form is part and parcel of the 
negative (or ambiguous) ethical value.  The problem with this strategy is that it reveals 
Nussbaum’s thesis as at best philosophically uninteresting and at worst tautologous.  The 
novels of Dickens, James, Proust, and Wright have been selected precisely for their moral 
value in the first instance and MNRN therefore collapses into:  
(MNMN) Moral novels are essentially moral in virtue of both the combination of 
agency and events represented and the agency of the author in adopting 
the framework particular to the novel. 
MNMN is not only compatible with my thesis, TREX, but fails to elevate the ethical value of 
narrative representation to moral value.  All exemplary narratives are essentially ethical and 
within the broad category of exemplary narratives sub-categories can be selected according to 
                                                 
37 Nussbaum, “Exactly and Responsibly,” 360. 
38 Nussbaum, “Exactly and Responsibly,” 355. 
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their ethical valence, e.g. realist novels (moral value) and surrealist novels (negative ethical 
value). 
 
The second approach to Nussbaum’s theory has focused on the substantive value of literary 
form, which is also expressed in terms of the literary experience as essentially moral.  Terry 
Eagleton offers a precise explanation of this conception of realist novels in the following two 
passages: 
(a) The classical realist novel is […] a moral practice in its very structure, shifting 
as it does from one centre of consciousness to another to constitute a complex 
whole.  Literature can therefore be seen as a moral project even before it has 
come to utter a moral sentiment.39 
(b) the exhausting, exhilarating process of tracking the microscopic twists and 
turns of meaning in The Ambassadors or The Golden Bowl is itself a moral 
experience, rather as the inordinate length of the Proustian sentence, its 
capacity to propel itself through any number of intricate sub-clauses and 
around any number of hairpin syntactical bends without losing its steady 
semantic thrust, is a stylistic performance with intimate relevance to questions 
of moral value.40 
In contrast to the focus on the moral value of literary content, which is characteristic of 
literary aesthetics, the focus on the moral value of literary form is characteristic of literary 
theory and tends to follow the theoretical approach in arguing on a case-by-case rather than 
categorical basis.  
 
                                                 
39 Terry Eagleton, The Event of Literature (London: Yale University Press, 2012), 60. 
40 Eagleton, The Event of Literature, 47. 
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The shifting structural complexity of realist novels is mentioned by both Eagleton and 
Nussbaum,41 but the feature is by no means restricted to the genre.  In his L.A. Quartet (The 
Black Dahlia, The Big Nowhere, L.A. Confidential, and White Jazz), James Ellroy employs 
parallel points of view and labyrinthine storylines to present a dark and disturbing vision of 
an oppressive, corrupt, racist, and homophobic mid-century Los Angeles.  The literary form 
of the Quartet becomes successively richer and more complex as the various protagonists 
become progressively more debased and irresponsible.  The detective duo of The Black 
Dahlia, Bucky Bleichert and Lee Blanchard, are choirboys in comparison with the only three 
central characters that survive the rigours of the Quartet – David Klein, Edmund Exley, and 
Dudley Smith.  The combination of formal innovation and downward moral spiral is most 
evident in White Jazz, where Ellroy uses the stream of consciousness style to original and 
subtle effect, creating an engrossing and compelling framework in which Klein is portrayed 
as worthy of admiration despite his many substantial moral flaws.  Ellroy’s series may not 
constitute an immoral practice in Eagleton’s terms, but it is certainly a morally ambiguous 
practice.  The problem for Nussbaum’s claims about the moral value of literary form is that it 
appears as if similar narrative means can be employed to disparate ethical ends.  Shifting 
structural complexity, microscopic twists and turns of meaning, inordinately long sentences, 
and stream of consciousness could all have different ethical valence if used by, e.g., either 
Henry James or James Ellroy.  There is thus no necessary relation between literary form and 
moral value and Eagleton explicitly avoids making any such commitment, defining the moral 
dimension of literature as ‘the realm of human meanings, values and qualities’.42   
 
Eagleton is also dismissive of the third way in which Nussbaum’s claims about the moral 
value of realist novels have been defended, by recourse to the literary imagination.  
                                                 
41 See, e.g., Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 139-142. 
42 Eagleton, The Event of Literature, 59. 
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Nussbaum maintains that the imaginative experience of reading realist novels qua literature 
promotes empathy and attention to the historical and social contexts of moral judgement.43  
She associates literary content with responsiveness to moral particulars and literary form with 
the relation between particulars and universals that is constitutive of moral judgement.  The 
idea is that if form and content are inseparable, then the responsiveness to particulars cannot 
be isolated from the play back and forth between particular and universal, in consequence of 
which the literary imagination opens up possibilities for moral deliberation and action.  The 
exercise of the literary imagination is therefore a moral exercise.  Eagleton does not mention 
Nussbaum, citing instead the tradition from Shelley to Iris Murdoch, but his critique is 
nonetheless applicable.  He claims that there is no necessary relation between the literary 
imagination and the moral – as opposed to ethical – imagination, noting that the imagination 
can be both creative and destructive and put to moral and immoral use.  Eagleton’s response 
is both concise and compelling: ‘It was not that the Nazis could not imagine how those they 
slaughtered were feeling.  It is that they did not care.’44  All three versions of Nussbaum’s 
argument for the moral value of realist novels are thus revealed to suffer from the same flaw, 
the failure to demonstrate a relation between exemplary narratives and moral rather than 
ethical value.  Simply put: literary content, literary form, and the literary imagination can all 
vary in their ethical valence. 
 
4. The Virtue of Narrative Representation  
 
Although Carroll is not usually identified as belonging to the ethical turn, he has in fact 
written numerous papers on the moral value of art and the link between artistic and moral 
                                                 
43 Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 115. 
44 Eagleton, The Event of Literature, 62. 
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value is one of the central themes of Art in Three Dimensions.45  With regard to the moral 
value of narrative art, Carroll has a rigorous and sophisticated approach that begins at a 
similar point to that which I established in §2: ‘artworks that are narratives of human affairs 
are generally the kind of thing it makes sense both to talk about in ethical terms and to assess 
morally.’46  Carroll maintains that there is a necessary relation between narrative 
representation and moral judgement.47  The engagement with a narrative necessarily involves 
the mobilisation of the knowledge and emotions of readers or audiences, which includes the 
activation of moral beliefs and emotions, and thus necessarily exercises the moral powers of 
those engaging with the narrative.48  He regards the emotions as the basis of this link between 
work and response and the capacity of narrative representation to stimulate the moral 
emotions of audiences is crucial to his thesis.  As with Nussbaum on form-content 
inseparability, I shall accept this claim without analysing the details of his position.49  Carroll 
maintains that narrative artworks can enrich the moral understanding of audiences, an 
approach he calls ‘the clarificationist view’.50  He is careful to ward off the objection that the 
knowledge yielded by artistic narrative representations is banal or platitudinous, maintaining 
that the refinement of virtue concepts is cognitively valuable because it cultivates greater 
discrimination and thereby enhances understanding.51  Carroll articulates the value of this 
                                                 
45 Carroll’s own ethical turn began in 1996, with the following two papers: “Moderate Moralism,” British 
Journal of Aesthetics 36 (1996), 223-238; and “Moral Realism in the Age of Postmodernism,” in G. Hoffman & 
A. Hornung (eds.), The Moral Turn of Postmodernism (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1996), 87-96.  
His continued interest in the subject is evident in his latest book, Minerva’s Night Out.  
46 Carroll, “Art, narrative, and moral understanding,” in J. Levinson (ed.), Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the 
Intersection (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 126-160: 138. 
47 Carroll’s conception of this relation is consistent with his view, expressed throughout Art in Three 
Dimensions and elsewhere, that both moral value and cognitive value are constitutive of artistic value, i.e. that 
there is a necessary relation between moral value and artistic value and between cognitive value and artistic 
value. 
48 Carroll, “Art, narrative, and moral understanding,” 141. 
49 Unlike Nussbaum on form-content inseparability, however, Carroll has specified the relation between 
narrative representation and the moral emotions on numerous occasions, most recently in Minerva’s Night Out, 
85-105 & Art in Three Dimensions, 373-395. 
50 Carroll, “Art, narrative, and moral understanding,” 142. 
51 Carroll, Art in Three Dimensions, 216. 
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refinement in his description of one of the means by which clarificationism operates, the 
deployment of a narrative device called a virtue wheel: 
A virtue wheel or virtue tableau comprises a studied array of characters who both 
correspond and contrast with each other along the dimension of a certain virtue or 
package of virtues – where some of the characters possess the virtue in question, or 
nearly so, or part of it, while others possess the virtue, but only defectively, or not at 
all, even to such an extent that their lack of the virtue in question amounts to the vice 
that corresponds to the virtue.52 
 
One of the examples he employs is Dickens’ Great Expectations, where the following 
characters are compared in terms of their virtues as parents: Joe Gargery, Abel Magwitch, 
Miss Havisham, and Mrs Gargery.53  The novel is structured so as to juxtapose these 
characters, situating each at a different position on the virtue wheel.  The correspondence and 
contrast between the virtues and vices displayed by these characters in their respective roles 
as parents in the novel provides a sustained exploration of the concept of parenting by the 
studious variation of similarity and difference.  The virtue wheel is part of the narrative 
framework created by Dickens.  In the standard mode of engagement readers accept the 
framework and respond to the characters in terms of their respective virtues and vices, i.e. 
positively towards Joe and negatively towards his wife.  The practice serves to sharpen reader 
recognition ability and make explicit the criteria for the application of the relevant concepts, 
which is of particular use in moral cases, where concepts are typically vague or abstract.54  
‘In this, such virtue wheels serve the purpose of moral education’.55  Virtue wheels in works 
such as Sophocles’ Antigone, the mystery play Mankind, Great Expectations, and E.M. 
                                                 
52 Carroll, Art in Three Dimensions, 217. 
53 Carroll, Art in Three Dimensions, 217. 
54 Carroll, Art in Three Dimensions, 220. 
55 Carroll, Art in Three Dimensions, 220. 
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Forster’s Howards End share the function of conceptual clarification with thought 
experiments.  Carroll is quick to address the charge that virtue wheels serve as nothing more 
than organisational devices aimed at preserving the coherence and unity of the work.  Virtue 
wheels do serve this purpose, as a formal device that enhances the thematic unity 
characteristic of exemplary narratives, but they also prompt self-reflection on the part of 
readers:  
Once the reader has begun to contemplate the pertinent virtues and their putative 
status in a given literary work, it is natural for her or him to reflect on how the 
characterizations implied by the text apply outside the text.  How are we to determine 
which virtues are true and which are false without considering the application of the 
relevant concepts outside the text?56 
 
The evidence Carroll offers for virtue wheels thus combines the theoretical, a rewarding 
interpretation of the respective works, with the empirical, the actual reader or audience 
response in the standard mode of engagement.  Drawing on an analysis of art history, Carroll 
offers further evidence that art has served a didactic purpose across not only time but space:  
unquestionably, in many of the artistic traditions of Asia, Africa, and Europe, art from 
time immemorial has served as a means for teaching about and meditating upon virtue 
and vice, often by example.57 
Most of Carroll’s elucidation is focused on literature, but he extends the existence of virtue 
wheels to all narrative art, including theatre, film, television, narrative painting, narrative 
sculpture, and dance.  ‘The virtue wheel is a structure that we encounter again and again in 
                                                 
56 Carroll, Art in Three Dimensions, 233. 
57 Carroll, Art in Three Dimensions, 225. 
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artworks, particularly narratives with more than one character.’58  The virtue wheel is thus 
part of the framework of certain narrative works of art such that the standard mode of 
engagement with those works clarifies the concept of the particular virtue represented and 
thereby produces an increased moral understanding in readers or audiences.  Virtue wheels 
contribute to the high narrativity of exemplary narratives and those exemplary narratives that 
deploy virtue wheels therefore have moral value in virtue of their narrativity, i.e. virtue 
wheels evince a necessary relation between narrative representation and moral value. 
 
The problem with the particular link Carroll proposes between narrative representation and 
moral value is not its weakness, but its strength.  A virtue wheel is clearly an element of both 
narrativity (linked, in particular, to thematic unity) and moral value (the clarification of virtue 
concepts) in the examples Carroll employs.  Consider, however, D.W. Griffiths’ prototype 
1915 feature film, The Birth of a Nation.  The cinematic work is an exemplary narrative in 
which the Ku Klux Klan are portrayed as heroic defenders of liberty in the former 
Confederate States during the Reconstruction Era.  The narrative deploys a virtue wheel with 
regard to the concept of racial equality, presenting an especially complex formal structure due 
to the salience of racial identity to the instantiation of the virtue and vice in individuals, a 
complexity that is enhanced by the presence of mixed race characters.  The virtue wheel 
includes: Ben Cameron (white, opposes), Flora Cameron (white, opposes), Mammy (black, 
opposes), Austin Stoneman (white, supports), Silas Lynch (mixed race, supports), and Gus 
(black, supports).  There are various other characters, such as Elsie Stoneman and Lydia 
Brown, whose attitudes lie in between support and opposition, which is to be expected from a 
nuanced treatment of a virtue concept.  The problem is that the virtue wheel is not virtuous at 
all because the narrative framework of which it forms a part determines a standard mode of 
                                                 
58 Carroll, Art in Three Dimensions, 223.  Carroll seems to be suggesting that the deployment of virtue wheels is 
not restricted to the category of exemplary narratives I defined in §1.  As the evidence for virtue wheels is 
strongest in exemplary narratives, I shall not discuss their deployment beyond this category. 
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engagement which invites admiration for the Camerons and their loyal black servants and 
contempt for white abolitionists and non-whites who wish to assert their equality.  The virtue 
wheel in The Birth of a Nation would not therefore be an example of clarificationism for 
Carroll because the presentation of racial equality as a vice works so as to obscure the virtue 
concept rather than clarify and refine it.   
 
Carroll’s argument for virtue wheels is, however, so compelling that it is clear that both types 
of narrative wheel – those which clarify and those which obscure moral concepts – contribute 
to the thematic unity, and thus narrativity, of the works in question.  For the sake of brevity I 
shall refer to the latter as vice wheels.  The vice wheel in The Birth of a Nation is part of the 
framework that determines the standard mode of engagement for the film and operates in a 
similar way to the virtue wheel in Great Expectations, but provides an immoral perspective 
on racial equality in contrast to the latter’s moral perspective on parenting.  In §3 I mentioned 
Henry Miller and Tropic of Cancer serves equally well here.  Miller’s semi-autobiographical 
novel deploys a vice wheel with regard to misogyny, establishing a framework that 
determines a standard mode of engagement in which Van Norden, who continually refers to 
women synecdochically by their genitals, is amusing and Fillmore, who marries a woman he 
has impregnated, is pathetic.  Narrative representations that deploy vice as opposed to virtue 
wheels have immoral value in virtue of their narrativity and the necessary relation is thus 
between narrative representation and ethical rather than moral value.  Although Carroll’s 
argument for the moral value of narrative representation is more rigorous than Nussbaum’s, it 
is also more sweeping: where she restricts her thesis to realist novels, he is clear that virtue 
wheels appear in a large proportion of exemplary narratives across the various narrative art 
forms.  He fails to account for vice wheels, however, which are counter-examples to the 
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proposed necessary relation between narrativity and moral value.59  As with Nussbaum, my 
thesis accommodates the strengths of Carroll’s theory – the deployment of virtue wheels in 
some narrative representations – without erroneously elevating the necessary relation from 
ethical value to moral value.  Exemplary narratives may clarify or obscure moral concepts in 
virtue of their narrativity and are thus, in my terms, essentially ethical. 
            
5. Closural Moral Order 
 
In his defence of the cognitive value of literature, Fessenbecker states that narrative form 
entails commitment to propositions about agency, intention, and other features of subjectivity 
– which he summarises as ‘the moral-philosophical commitments inherent in narrative 
form’.60  In his terminology, therefore, my claim is that narrative form has inherent ethical 
commitments.  Harpham takes this conception a step further, not merely exploring the ethical 
commitments of narrative form, but reconceptualising narrative representation in ethical 
terms.  His starting point articulates his disillusion with contemporary research:       
One of the most obdurate problems in literary theory is narrative form, the study of 
which seems to have stalled since Aristotle’s statement that the plot of tragedy 
proceeds towards a moment of reversal, followed by recognition, and ending in a 
dénouement.  […]  But the attempt to define further the basic form of narrative has 
been virtually abandoned, defeated by the apparent shapelessness and singularity of 
extended narratives.’61 
Harpham seeks to identify the connection – temporal, causal, or thematic – between agency 
and event and recommends that narrative form be understood in terms of Hume’s distinction 
                                                 
59 Vice wheels are potentially doubly problematic for Carroll because they are both moral defects (promoting 
vice) and cognitive defects (obscuring concepts).  See: fn.47.  
60 Fessenbecker, “In Defense of Paraphrase,” 121. 
61 Geoffrey Galt Harpham, Shadows of Ethics: Criticism and the Just Society (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 1999), 35. 
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between is and ought, or fact and value.  Both the distinction and Hume’s purpose in 
describing it have been the subject of extensive debate, which has focused largely on what 
R.M. Hare refers to as Hume’s Law, the proposal that no “ought” can derived from an “is”.62  
Harpham’s ultimate aim is to employ the relationship between narrative and ethics to 
establish a reciprocal relationship between literature and philosophy.  He maintains that 
ethics provides an explanation of narrative representation and that narrative in turn 
contributes to ethics by crossing the chasm between fact and value.63  My interest is neither in 
the proposed contribution of narrative to ethics nor the more fundamental relation between 
literature and philosophy, but in Harpham’s explanation of narrative form in exclusively 
ethical terms.64  This explanation is made by means of plot. 
 
I deliberately avoided characterising either minimal or exemplary narratives in terms of 
“plot” in §1, due to the variety of ways in which the word is employed across the 
philosophical and theoretical traditions.  White claims that narrative form is imposed upon a 
sequence of events in narrative history65 and this imposition is described as follows by 
Goldie: 
This process, which […] I will call emplotment, is one by which a bare description of 
events, such as one might find in an annal or chronicle, can be transformed into a 
narrative, giving coherence, meaningfulness, and evaluative and emotional import to 
what is narrated.66  
                                                 
62 R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Level, Method, and Point (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981), 16.  Hume sets out the 
distinction in Book III, Part 1, Section (i) of the Treatise.  See: David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. 
L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon, 1740 [1888]), 469. 
63 Harpham, Shadows of Ethics, 37 & 43. 
64 I am sceptical of Harpham’s conception of narrative’s contribution to ethics and although the relation he 
envisages is reciprocal, each of the two aspects can be considered in isolation. 
65 White, “The Value of Narrativity,” 23. 
66 Goldie, The Mess Inside, 9. 
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Emplotment is thus the procedure by which a sequence of real or fictional events is 
represented in narrative form and plot distinguishes representations with narrative form from 
those without.  Both White’s discussion and Goldie’s description imply that plot is restricted 
to exemplary narratives, and Harpham’s definition follows suit: 
The most general and adequate conception of a narrative plot is that it moves from an 
unstable inaugural condition, a condition that is but ought not – a severance of the two 
[fact and value] – through a process of sifting and exploration in search of an 
unknown but retrospectively inevitable condition that is and truly ought-to-be.67 
A narrative representation is formed by the process of emplotment, emplotment entails 
movement from the condition of is-but-ought-not-to-be to the condition of is-and-ought-to-
be, and narrative form is therefore essentially ethical. 
 
Two necessarily over-simplified examples will serve to illustrate Harpham’s 
reconceptualisation:   
(a) The plot of Downfall moves from Traudl Junge’s pride at being selected as 
one of Hitler’s personal secretaries in 1942 (is-but-ought-not-to-be) to her 
decision to remain loyal in the Führerbunker to the shame she experiences 
after the war (is-and-ought-to-be). 
(b) The plot of Hard Times moves from Thomas Gradgrind’s attempts to inculcate 
relentlessly pragmatic values in the children of Coketown (is-but-ought-not-to-
be) to his recognition of the limitations of pure rationalism and thence to his 
rejection of utilitarian philosophy (is-and-ought-to-be). 
The is-and-ought-to-be captures the significance of closure that I emphasised in §1, which in 
turn drew on Carroll’s statement that a narrative which concludes gives the feeling that it has 
                                                 
67 Harpham, Shadows of Ethics, 36. 
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ceased at precisely the right point, i.e. is retrospectively inevitable in Harpham’s terms.  
Closure contributes to the narrative framework, which determines the standard mode of 
engagement in the adoption of the internal perspective, and which is itself subject to ethical 
evaluation in the adoption of the external perspective.  The standard mode of engagement 
with (a) and (b) invites one to view both Traudl and Gradgrind as misguided individuals who 
– to some extent at least – come to realise the error of their respective ways.  As such, both 
Hirschbiegel and Dickens are subject to positive ethical evaluation from the external 
perspective.       
 
Although Harpham is critical of Nussbaum for elevating the ethical value of novels to the 
moral, he makes a similar error.68  Here, he identifies a problem in White to which he 
believes his explanation of narrative form in ethical terms has provided the solution: 
The difficulty, as one of White’s critics has pointed out, lies in the apparent 
suggestion that there are as many moral orders as there are narratives.  But if we 
define closure in the way I have suggested, we can see that closure achieves a moral 
order that is “other” to that which preceded it, an other to whatever it is in the 
narrative that is but ought not to be.  There are an infinite number of narratives, but 
only one closural moral order, which is other not to other narratives but to the 
incessant questing of all narrative for formal closure.  Insofar as our aesthetic 
education acclimates us to narrative, then, it instructs us in ethics.69 
Recall from §2 that White maintains narrative histories are distinguished from non-narrative 
historical representations (annals and chronicles) by providing an ethical resolution, i.e. the 
author passes judgement on the sequence of events represented as either moral, immoral, or 
                                                 
68 Harpham, Shadows of Ethics, 220-242. 
69 Harpham, Shadows of Ethics, 43.  It is not clear to me that the existence of numerous moral – i.e., ethical in 
my terms – orders in White is problematic, but my interest here is in Harpham’s solution whether or not the 
problem exists. 
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morally ambiguous.  The criticism mentioned by Harpham is that there are many moral – 
ethical in my terms – orders because White’s theory accommodates both Riefenstahl and 
Hirschbiegel’s representations of Hitler as narrative histories.  In contrast, Harpham is 
pursuing a closural moral order and attempting to relate narrativity to moral rather than 
ethical value. 
 
Harpham has previously made the uncontroversial statement that concern by the self for the 
other is essential to ethics: ‘I see this intimate and dynamic engagement with otherness as the 
key to the kingdom of ethics: where such an engagement is, there is ethics.’70  This 
conception of moral philosophy, popular in the theoretical tradition, is derived from 
Levinas.71  With regard to the ethical turn in criticism, Derek Attridge describes the relevance 
of Levinas’ focus on the other in terms of literature’s ‘apprehension of otherness’, i.e. the 
capacity of literary works to confront readers with singularity, inventiveness, and alterity.72  
With regard to narrative representation, Harpham’s idea is that the is-and-ought-to-be of 
closure is other to the is-but-ought-not-to-be with which the plot is inaugurated.  In (i) and 
(ii) above, therefore, the respective plots move from an unstable condition, Junge’s pride and 
Gradgrind’s pragmatism, to an inevitable closure, Junge’s shame and Gradgrind’s rejection of 
utilitarianism.  The conditions of closure are different from – other to – the conditions of 
inauguration and the process of exploration thus involves a dynamic engagement with 
otherness and consequently has moral rather than ethical value.  As plot, i.e. movement from 
is-but-ought-not-to-be to is-and-ought-to-be is, is characteristic of all exemplary narratives, 
Harpham has established the desired link: all narrative representations that are high in 
                                                 
70 Harpham, Shadows of Ethics, x. 
71 See, e.g.: Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1961 [2007]); Ethics and Infinity, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1982). 
72 Derek Attridge The Singularity of Literature (New York: Routledge, 2004), 67. 
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narrativity exhibit a closural moral order and there is thus a necessary relation between 
narrativity and moral value. 
 
Concern for the other is indeed ethical and is also usually, but not necessarily, moral.  My 
objection to Harpham is the by now familiar case of narrative representations with negative 
ethical value, which I shall consider in the terminology he employs.  In the respective 
narratives of Triumph of the Will and The Birth of a Nation the otherness that the standard 
mode of engagement requires the audience to apprehend involves the acceptance of 
frameworks which promote the NSDAP and KKK.  Levinas is correct in claiming that ethics 
begins with interest in the well-being of an other instead of – or in addition to – self-interest, 
but interest in the other is a necessary rather than sufficient condition of moral agency.  The 
plots of both Triumph of the Will and The Birth of a Nation, e.g., are inaugurated with an is-
but-ought-not-to-be, explore and apprehend otherness, and close with an is-and-ought-to-be.  
Neither closural order could, however, be considered moral because the otherness that the 
standard mode of engagement requires one to assimilate is clearly immoral in both cases.  
Closural orders are not simply made moral by embracing otherness and – like novels and 
virtue/vice wheels – can be moral, immoral, or morally ambiguous.  The necessary relation 
expressed in the definition of plot as the movement from is-but-ought-not-to-be to is-and-
ought-to-be is thus between narrativity and ethical value and Harpham’s attempt to link 
narrativity with a closural moral order fails. 
     
Despite my criticism of closural moral order, Harpham’s reconceptualisation of narrative 
form in ethical terms is worth preserving for its illumination of the ethical essence of 
narrative representation.  In §2, I claimed that the combination of agency and events in 
narratives entails an ethical dimension to narrative representation the consequence of which is 
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that the engagement with a narrative representation qua narrative representation is incomplete 
without ethical evaluation.  I then argued that the ethical dimension is more complex in 
exemplary narratives, which are essentially ethical in virtue of both the combination of 
agency and events represented and the agency of the author in adopting the framework 
particular to the narrative.  Harpham’s conception of the emplotment characteristic of 
exemplary narratives as entailing movement from the condition of is-but-ought-not-to-be to 
the condition of is-and-ought-to-be articulates the necessity of the relationship between 
exemplary narratives and ethical value without prioritising ethical value above other narrative 
values (e.g., cognitive value and aesthetic value).  The claim that exemplary narratives are 
essentially ethical is thus restricted to the thesis that they are essentially subject to a dual 
ethical evaluation.  From the internal perspective the actions of the characters, whether real or 
fictional, may be judged as if they were actual; from the external perspective, the author may 
be judged for the is-and-ought-to-be with which he or she concludes the narrative; like the 
actions of the characters, the author’s is-and-ought-to-be may be moral, immoral, or morally 
ambiguous.  Finally, the significance of this ethical valence may vary from one exemplary 
narrative to another.  My conclusion is that there is nothing about narrative representation – 
whether exemplary or minimal – that entails moral value, only ethical value.  In colloquial 
terms, every story does indeed have a moral, but that moral may be virtuous, vicious, or 
somewhere in between.73 
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